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MINING FOR ANSWERS: THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA ADDRESSES THE STATE’S ABILITY TO
EXERCISE ITS POLICE POWERS ON FEDERAL LAND IN
PEOPLE V. RINEHART
I. THE STEPPING STONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUES
SURROUNDING PEOPLE V. RINEHART
Beginning in 1848, gold discovery in California led to rapid
population growth and expansion in the western United States.1
Today, the prospect of discovering gold persists for many who en-
gage in mining activities in western states such as California.2  While
a potentially prosperous activity, gold mining leaves an adverse envi-
ronmental footprint on the land and waters where mining occurs.3
Early miners, unknowing of the risk, deposited mercury into the
waters.4  Today, the remaining mercury wreaks havoc on the ecosys-
tems of western United States rivers.5
The predominant federal law governing mineral mining in the
United States is the Mining Law of 1872 (the Act).6  Congress en-
acted the Act to promote the exploration of valuable minerals such
as gold, but the preeminent federal mining statute contains very
few environmental protections.7  Environmental interest groups fre-
quently criticize the law for being outdated and “inimical to today’s
needs and values.”8  The lack of environmental protections con-
1. See California Gold Rush (1848-1858), HARVARD UNIV. LIBRARY OPEN COLLEC-
TIONS PROGRAM, http://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/immigration/goldrush.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 3, 2018) (describing early years of gold discovery in United States).
2. See Adrianne DelCotto, Suction Dredge Mining: The United States Forest Service
Hands Miners the Golden Ticket, 40 ENVTL. L. 1021, 1024 (2010) (discussing gold
mining in modern times).
3. See id. (noting that mining activities have caused environmental issues).
4. See id. (explaining environmental hazards caused by mining in mid to late
nineteenth century).
5. See id. at 1026 (describing environmental impacts of modern mining
techniques).
6. See Tyler L. Weidlich, Note, The Mining Law Continuum – Is There a Contem-
porary Prospect for Reform?, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 951, 953 (2006) (introducing Mining
Law of 1872).
7. See DelCotto, supra note 2, at 1025 (noting lack of environmental protec-
tion in Mining Law of 1872).
8. Andrew P. Morriss et al., Homesteading Rock: A Defense of Free Access Under the
General Mining Law of 1872, 34 ENVTL. L. 745, 749 (2004) (citing Christine Knight,
Comment, A Regulatory Minefield: Can the Department of Interior Say ‘No’ to A Hardrock
Mine?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 626 (2002)) (listing criticisms of Mining Law of
1872).
(283)
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tained in the Act, coupled with increased knowledge of the pollu-
tants produced by certain types of mining and the enactment of
subsequent regulations to curb environmental destruction, has led
to frequent conflict between miners and those attempting to pro-
tect the environment.9  As such, administrative agencies and the
federal government have focused on protecting lands and waters
from destruction.10
People v. Rinehart11 stems from the aforementioned conflict, in-
volving a suit between a miner and the State of California over the
“competing desire[ ]” of resources.12  California attempted to mini-
mize the adverse environmental impacts of mining by requiring
permits for a popular form of mining known as suction dredging.13
In 2009, the California legislature imposed a temporary morato-
rium on the issuance of these permits based on legislative findings
that “suction or vacuum dredge mining results in various adverse
environmental impacts to protected fish species, the water quality
of [its] state, and the health of the people of [its] state.”14  Appel-
lant, Brandon Rinehart (Rinehart), was convicted of “possession
and use of an unpermitted suction dredge” under California Fish
and Game Code section 5653 because he was operating a suction
dredge without a permit, which he could not obtain due to the
moratorium.15  Rinehart subsequently appealed the conviction,
claiming the Act preempted the contrary state law mandating the
moratorium.16  The Supreme Court of California held that the Act
did not preclude California’s suction dredging moratorium because
the Act did not grant a federal right to mine free from the state’s
exercise of its police power.17
9. For a further discussion of case law stemming from federal mining laws, see
infra notes 80-101 and accompanying text.
10. See Weidlich, supra note 6, at 954-56 (explaining various reforms providing
environmental protections for mining activities).
11. 377 P.3d 818 (Cal. 2016).
12. Id. at 820 (outlining basis of conflict between Brandon Rinehart and State
of California).
13. See id. at 820-21 (describing California Fish and Game Code section 5653).
This section allows the Department of Fish and Wildlife to issue permits as long as
the “dredging would not harm fish.” See id. For a description of suction dredging,
see infra note 25 and accompanying text.
14. Id. at 821 (explaining background on case).
15. See id. at 821-22 (stating Rinehart’s charges).
16. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 820 (discussing Rinehart’s legal argument).  Rine-
hart relied on a provision in the Mining Act of 1982, which allows for “exploration
and purchase” of U.S. lands by U.S. citizens under certain conditions. See 30 U.S.C.
§ 22.
17. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 820 (discussing hierarchy of states’ police powers
and federal law).
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This Note assesses the various environmental, legislative, and
constitutional issues surrounding People v. Rinehart.18  Part II of this
Note discusses the facts surrounding Rinehart, the Supreme Court
of California’s holding, and the procedural history of the case.19
Part III provides a background of California state law, the Mining
Law of 1872, and the doctrine of preemption.20  Part IV discusses
the Supreme Court of California’s opinion in Rinehart.21  Part V
analyzes the Supreme Court of California’s decision.22  Finally, Part
VI discusses the broader impact this case may have on issues of fed-
eralism with respect to the regulation of federal lands in the United
States.23
II. BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: FACTS DESCRIBING THE
CONFLICT BETWEEN RINEHART AND THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In 2012, Brandon Rinehart was charged with possession and
unpermitted use of a suction dredge, pursuant to California Fish
and Game Code section 5653.24  A suction dredge is an instrument
used by miners to extract gold from waterways, through a process
called suction dredging.25  The California Fish and Game Code
states, inter alia, “The use of vacuum or suction dredge equipment
by a person in a river, stream, or lake of this state is prohibited,
except as authorized under a permit issued to that person by the
department in compliance with the regulations adopted pursuant
to Section 5653.9.”26  Because of a moratorium on the issuance of
suction dredging permits in California, Rinehart was without a per-
18. For a further discussion of the issues in People v. Rinehart, see infra notes
45-101 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the facts, procedural history, and holding in
People v. Rinehart, see infra notes 24-44 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the background of California state law, the Act,
and federal preemption, see infra notes 45-101 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court of California’s analysis in
People v. Rinehart, see infra notes 102-150 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the critique of the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia’s decision, see infra notes 151-191 and accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion of the potential impact of People v. Rinehart, see
infra notes 192-213 and accompanying text.
24. People v. Rinehart, 377 P.3d 818, 821 (Cal. 2016) (outlining Rinehart’s
charges).
25. See DelCotto, supra note 2, at 1026-27 (describing suction dredge instru-
ment).  A suction dredge uses an engine-powered hose to remove sediment from
the floor of a waterway; the sediment passes up through the hose and then
through a sluice box, where gold is trapped, and the other material is released
back into the waterway. Id.
26. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5653 (2016) (quoting California statute that
criminalizes use of suction dredging equipment without permit).
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mit when he was cited while dredging in Plumas National Forest.27
Rinehart did, however, have a federal mining claim on the portion
of the land on which he was dredging.28  The Mining Act of 1872,
“allow[s] United States citizens to go onto unappropriated, unre-
served public land to prospect for and develop certain minerals.”29
The discovery of minerals “followed by the minimal procedures re-
quired to formally ‘locate’ the deposit, gives an individual the right
of exclusive possession of the land for mining purposes,[ ] i.e., a
mining claim.”30  Accordingly, Rinehart believed that his federal
mining claim superseded any requirement by the state that he have
a permit in order to operate his suction dredge.31 Rinehart filed a
demurrer contending that the suction dredge permit requirement
in section 5653 of the Fish and Game Code, as well as the then
recently enacted moratorium on the issuance of such permits, pre-
vented him from “using the only commercially practicable method
of extracting gold from his mining claim.”32  Further, Rinehart ar-
gued that Congress had granted him a right to mine on the land
that made up his mining claim without “material interference,” and
that California’s limitations on the use of suction dredges “should
be preempted as an obstacle to Congress’s purposes and
objectives.”33
A trial court overruled Rinehart’s demurrer, rejecting as a mat-
ter of law the argument that California state law should be pre-
empted by federal law.34  The trial court did not allow Rinehart to
27. See Brandon Rinehart, Why I’m in Court, PEOPLE V RINEHART, http://pe
oplevrinehart.org/why-im-in-court/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2017) [hereinafter Why
I’m in Court] (describing Rinehart’s arrest).
28. Id. (explaining Rinehart’s belief that his federal mining claim gave him
right to mine on land and that his federal right superseded California state law
requiring permits).  Rinehart possessed an “unpatented claim[, which] is a posses-
sory interest in a particular area solely for the purpose of mining[, which] may be
contested by the government or a private party.” See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 821 n.2
(citing Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522, 1525 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994) (defining unpat-
ented claims).
29. Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 821 (quoting United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 86
(1985)) (citing 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1872)) (explaining general mining laws enacted in
nineteenth century maintain relevance today and allow prospective miners to lo-
cate and develop minerals on federal land).
30. Id. (quoting Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 86 (1985)) (citing 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1872))
(describing procedure of obtaining mining claim by locating mineral deposit).
31. See Why I’m in Court, supra note 27 (explaining Rinehart’s belief that fed-
eral regulations superseded state regulations).
32. Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 821 (explaining content of Rinehart’s demurrer).
33. Id. (describing Rinehart’s belief that federal mining law superseded Cali-
fornia state law).
34. Id. (stating trial court’s reasoning for rejecting Rinehart’s demurrer).
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present testimony in support of this argument.35  Rinehart waived a
jury trial and received a bench trial.36  Subsequently, Rinehart was
convicted on two misdemeanors, given three years’ probation, and
fined $832.37
Rinehart appealed to California’s Court of Appeal in 2013.38
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling.39  Agreeing
with Rinehart, the court concluded that the “federal mining law
should be interpreted as preempting any state law that unduly ham-
pers mining on federal land.”40  The court also found that “Rine-
hart had made a colorable argument that (1) the state regulatory
scheme amounted to a de facto ban on suction dredging and (2)
this ban rendered mining on his claim ‘commercially impractica-
ble.’”41  As a result, the Court of Appeal remanded the case for
further proceedings.42  The state petitioned for and was granted re-
view of the Court of Appeal’s ruling.43  The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision, noting that while
the federal mining law reflects Congress’s intent to provide miners
with the ability to claim title to land, the law does not guarantee a
right to mine that is immune from the states’ police powers.44
III. DOWN THE RIVER: BACKGROUND ON CALIFORNIA STATE LAW
AND FEDERAL MINING STATUTES
The discovery of gold and the promise of prosperity during the
gold rush of the nineteenth century encouraged an influx of migra-
tion to the western United States.45  In fact, from 1848 to 1850, the
population of San Francisco skyrocketed from one thousand to
35. Id. (stating trial court’s exclusion of testimony Rinehart would have used
in support of his defense).
36. Id. (explaining Rinehart’s waiver of his right to jury trial).
37. Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 822 (describing Rinehart’s conviction and sentence
by trial court); see also Why I’m in Court, supra note 27 (stating amount of Rinehart’s
fine).
38. Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 822 (explaining Rinehart’s appeal to Court of Ap-
peal); see also Why I’m in Court, supra note 27 (stating date of appeal).
39. Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 822 (stating Court of Appeal’s reversal).
40. Id. (quoting Court of Appeal’s belief that federal law mining law should
supersede California’s state law requiring permits for suction dredging).
41. Id. (quoting Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 587
(1987)) (quoting Court of Appeal’s reasoning in support of Rinehart’s argument).
42. Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 822 (stating Court of Appeal remanded case for fur-
ther proceedings).
43. Id. at 820 (stating Supreme Court of California’s grant of state’s petition
for review).
44. See id. (describing Supreme Court of California’s holding).
45. See California Gold Rush (1848-1858), supra note 1 (providing background
on history of gold rush).
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over twenty thousand people.46  Due to increased mineral explora-
tion in the American West, Congress enacted mining laws in 1872
which made “all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the
United States . . . free and open to exploration and purchase.”47
The Mining Law of 1872 is still in effect today with minimal
changes.48  The promise to strike gold, however, has led to environ-
mental concerns stemming from mercury remaining in the very wa-
ters that were, and still are used to prospect for gold.49 Tissues of
plants, animals, and other organisms can absorb the mercury from
waters and streams.50  The increased mercury levels in these orga-
nisms can eventually make them deadly for human consumption.51
Cleanup of these waters, if done at all, is completed years after dam-
age has taken place and is frequently funded by taxpayers.52  This,
in turn, has caused many western states, such as California, to enact
environmental regulations to protect aquatic ecosystems that are at
risk of being negatively affected by mining.53  The regulation of
mining has led to inevitable conflict between miners and the gov-
ernments enacting such regulations.54  One of the main conten-
tions in this ongoing legal battle is the issue of federalism: whether
the Act precludes the application of the state law.55
A. California State Law
California has regulated suction dredging in the state for the
last fifty years.56  Originally enacted as Fish and Game Code section
46. Id. (noting population increases due to gold rush).
47. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1872) (quoting language of Mining Law of 1872); see also
Andrew P. Morriss et al., Homesteading Rock: A Defense of Free Access Under the General
Mining Law of 1872, 34 ENVTL. L. 745, 761 (2004) (explaining Mining Law of 1872
was motivated by mineral rushes in nineteenth century).
48. See Morris, supra note 8, at 751-52 (describing lack of reform to Mining
Law of 1872).
49. For a discussion of the environmental impacts of the gold rush, see supra
notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
50. See DelCotto, supra note 2, at 1025 (describing adverse environmental im-
pact of mercury on aquatic organisms).
51. See id. at 1027-28 (explaining damaging effects of mercury in organisms
consumed by humans).
52. See Weidlich, supra note 6, at 952, 957 (explaining cleanup of ecosystems
damaged by mining).
53. See DelCotto, supra note 2, at 1023 (noting states have enacted environ-
mental regulations to help combat adverse environmental effects of mining).
54. For a further discussion of case law stemming from federal mining laws,
see infra notes 80-101 and accompanying text.
55. For a further discussion of federalism conflicts that arise from state law
and Mining Law of 1872, see infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
56. People v. Rinehart, 377 P.3d 818, 820 (Cal. 2016) (describing California’s
history of suction dredging regulation).
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5653, the regulation authorized California’s Department of Fish
and Wildlife “to issue permits for suction dredging, so long as it
determined the dredging would not harm fish.”57  A violation for
dredging without a permit would result in a misdemeanor.58  Fu-
ture amendments of section 5653 gave the Department of Fish and
Wildlife “authority to designate particular waterways off-limits to
suction dredging and made possession of a suction dredge near
such waters unlawful.”59
In 2009, as a result of concerns of dredging’s effects on endan-
gered coho salmon habitats, the California “[l]egislature imposed a
temporary moratorium on the issuance of dredging permits pend-
ing further environmental review by the [d]epartment.”60  The
moratorium on suction dredging, which cited “various adverse envi-
ronmental impacts to protected fish species, the water quality of
[California], and the health of the people of [California],” went
into effect immediately.61  In 2011, the legislature set a sunset provi-
sion that indicated if “environmental review and new regulations
were not complete” by June 30, 2016, the moratorium would no
longer be in effect.62  In 2012, the Department of Fish and Wildlife
concluded “it lacked regulatory authority to address fully the envi-
ronmental impacts of suction dredging.”63  In 2015, the legislature
removed the 2016 sunset provision and enacted legislation clarify-
ing that the Department of Fish and Wildlife and other states agen-
cies’ possessed the regulatory authority to oversee and regulate
suction dredge permits.64  The moratorium on the issuance of
these permits remains in place.65
B. Preemption of State Law on Federal Land
The United States Constitution’s Property Clause vests Con-
gress with the power to “make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States.”66  With respect to the Property Clause, both the state and
57. See id. (explaining origins of section 5653 of the Fish and Game Code).
58. See id. at 820-21 (describing sanctions for violating section 5653).
59. See id. at 821 (citation omitted) (describing changes to section 5653).
60. See id. (explaining basis for moratorium on issuance of suction dredging
permits).
61. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 821 (explaining reasoning for moratorium).
62. See id. (describing sunset provision on moratorium).
63. See id. (discussing findings from review).
64. See id. (noting legislation was enacted to give agency power to administer
moratorium).
65. Id. (explaining current status of moratorium).
66. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (outlining Constitution’s Property Clause).
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federal government are sovereign.67  States are “‘free to enforce
[their] criminal and civil laws’ on federal land, unless those laws
conflict with federal legislation or regulation; in the event of a con-
flict, of course, ‘state laws must recede.’”68  The Property Clause,
unlike the Commerce Clause, does not have a dormant aspect.69
When Congress is silent on the issue, states may exercise their po-
lice powers on federal land, so long as it is within the state’s territo-
rial boundaries.70  “Congress must act affirmatively” in order “to
displace the application of state law on federal land.”71  When state
and federal laws conflict, “state laws must recede.”72
Obstacle preemption is a principle in which federal law will
preempt state law.73  The principle of obstacle preemption articu-
lates “that a state may not adopt laws impairing ‘the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.’”74  Establishing obstacle preemption
requires proof Congress had particular purposes and
objectives in mind, a demonstration that leaving state law
in place would compromise those objectives, and a reason
to discount the possibility the Congress that enacted the
legislation was aware of the background tapestry of state
law and content to let that law remain as it was.75
The Supreme Court has held that there is a “strong presump-
tion against [obstacle] preemption in areas where the state has a
firmly established regulatory role.”76
67. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 822 (explaining dual sovereignty of Property
Clause).
68. Id. (quoting Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976)) (explaining
extent of state exercise of police power on federal lands).
69. See id. (outlining differences between Property Clause and Commerce
Clause in regards to state sovereignty).  The “dormant” Commerce Clause provides
that states cannot discriminate against or burden interstate commerce because of
Congress’s grant to regulate commerce “among the several states.” See Commerce
Clause, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/commerce_clause
(last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
70. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 822 (illustrating relevance of lack of dormant
aspect in Property Clause).
71. Id. (explaining requirements for federal law to displace state law).
72. Id. (quoting Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 543) (explaining federal
law is supreme when it conflicts with state law).
73. See id. (describing obstacle preemption).
74. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (describing stan-
dard for obstacle preemption).
75. Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 823 (quoting Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc.,
361 P.3d 868, 877 (2015)) (discussing elements of obstacle preemption).
76. Id. (noting Supreme Court has traditionally applied strong presumption
against preemption of state law).
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C. Preemption of Federal Mining Laws
The Mining Law of 1872 remains the principal federal mining
regulation today.77  The Act allows United States citizens to enter
freely onto federal land, explore for valuable minerals, and in cer-
tain circumstances, claim a possessory interest on such federal
land.78  Prior to the Act, miners operating on federal land were not
under the jurisdiction of federal law and were “subject instead to
state and territorial law[,] and local custom.”79
The case law that has ensued since the promulgation of the Act
has consistently held that while the Act serves to promote mining, it
does not create a federal right to mine on federal land free from
the interests of the state.80  In Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel
Mining Co.,81 California state officials sought an injunction against
hydraulic mining companies that were discharging debris into vari-
ous state waterways.82  The defendants in Woodruff argued that the
environmental impacts were well known and that the Mining Law
of 1872 should preempt any state or local legislation because Con-
gress enacted the Act with full knowledge of the consequences of
mining.83  The court, however, rejected this argument and found
that the purpose of the Act was to grant miners land interests and
legalize what had been previously considered trespass.84  The court
77. See 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1872) (noting Mining Law of 1872 remains in effect).
78. See id. (discussing miners’ rights per Mining Law of 1872).
79. Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 825 (citing Sparrow v. Strong, 70 U.S. 97, 104
(1865)) (explaining which laws regulated miners prior to Mining Act of 1872).
80. See Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 594 (1987)
(holding state agency’s mining permit requirement was preempted by Mining Law
of 1872); see also Woodruff v. N. Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753, 773-34
(C.C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding purpose of Mining Law of 1872 was to grant property
rights); see also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 632-37
(1981) (holding state tax was not preempted by federal mining laws).  Although
the Mining Law of 1872 was not at conflict in Commonwealth Edison, the court used
similar logic as in the Mining Law of 1872 cases, determining a federal statutes’
text and legislative history did not suggest a tax on coal mining would conflict with
the purpose of the Act. Id. But see S.D. Mining Ass’n, Inc. v. Lawrence County, 155
F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding Mining Law of 1872 preempted local
ordinance banning mining in particular area of national park).
81. 18 F. 753 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884).
82. See id. at 756 (describing purpose of suit as attempt to restrain miners
from discharging debris into waterways).
83. See id. at 770-71 (explaining defendant’s assertion that Congress and Cali-
fornia state legislature authorized mining knowing mining process produced deb-
ris to be released into waters).
84. See id. at 773-74 (explaining Mining Law of 1872 established property
rights for miners on public lands).
9
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held miners were not immune to state or local regulation just be-
cause the federal mining law existed.85
In California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co.,86 the author-
itative Supreme Court case on the Mining Law of 1872, Granite
Rock, a mining company, brought suit against a California state
agency, contesting the agency’s requirement that it receive a permit
before it could begin mining operations.87  The mining company
believed the Mining Act of 1872, among other regulations, pre-
empted the state’s permit requirement.88  The Court set forth the
standard of when federal law should preempt state law, stating
“when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or
where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” then state law should
be preempted.89  The Supreme Court found the Act did not pre-
empt state law because the federal law and state permit require-
ments were distinguishable and there was no true conflict between
state and federal law.90  The Court reasoned the permit require-
ments were an environmental regulation and that Granite Rock
could still exercise its rights granted by the Act while also comply-
ing with the state’s regulations.91
The preemption argument that stems from Granite Rock is that
state environmental regulations may frustrate the purposes and
objectives of Congress.92  As such, cases revolving around the prin-
ciple of preemption often include an analysis of congressional in-
85. See id. at 810 (describing sale to purchasers of lands under Act did not
prevent states from exercising police powers over land).
86. 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
87. See generally id. at 575-77 (describing facts of case).
88. Id. at 577 (explaining Granite Rock’s belief that permit requirement was
preempted by Mining Law of 1872).
89. Id. at 581 (citation omitted) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238, 248 (1984)) (restating standard for federal preemption of state law).
90. See id. at 593 (holding permit requirement was not preempted by Mining
Law of 1872); see also Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450
U.S. 311, 317 (1981) (noting court’s reluctance to apply preemption to state and
local ordinances); see also Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc., 361 P.3d 868, 877
(Cal. 2015) (holding strong presumption against obstacle preemption exists where
state has firmly established regulatory role).
91. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 584-89 (explaining how California’s permit re-
quirements did not conflict with Mining Law of 1872).
92. Id. at 581 (citing to Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (explain-
ing standard for preemption is proper when state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”).
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tent.93  In Lawrence County,94 the Eighth Circuit disallowed a county
ordinance that prohibited the issuance of permits for surface metal
mining, finding that the ordinance was in conflict with the Mining
Law of 1872.95  In reaching this conclusion, the Eighth Circuit con-
cluded the congressional intent of the Act was “the encouragement
of exploration for and mining of valuable minerals located on fed-
eral lands.”96  Thus, the court determined the city ordinance, which
acted as a de facto ban on mining, frustrated Congress’s intent to
promote mining on federal land.97
In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,98 mining companies al-
leged that federal statutes designed to encourage the use of coal
preempted a state tax on coal extracted from federal lands.99  The
Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s argument that federal coal
laws preempt all state legislation that may have a negative impact on
the use of coal.100  The Court found that nothing in the federal
statute’s text or legislative history suggested a tax would conflict
with the statute’s purpose.101
IV. SIFTING THROUGH THE SAND: NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA’S DECISION
The Supreme Court of California examined a variety of issues
before concluding that the California moratorium on suction
dredging was not preempted by Mining Law of 1872 in Rinehart.102
In reaching its conclusion, the court inquired into the Act’s legisla-
tive history and employed a textual analysis to determine that con-
trary to Rinehart’s assertion, the Act did not establish a federal right
93. See generally People v. Rinehart, 377 P.3d 818, 823-27 (Cal. 2016) (conclud-
ing state law posed no obstacle to congressional objectives espoused in Mining Law
of 1872 and 30 U.S.C. § 612(b)); see also S.D. Mining Ass’n, Inc. v. Lawrence
County, 155 F.3d 1005, 1009-11 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting use of same approach to
answer preemption question, but arrival at different conclusion).
94. 155 F.3d 1005 (1998).
95. Id. 155 at 1011 (holding Mining Law of 1872 preempted de facto ban on
mining).
96. Id. at 1010 (discussing Eighth Circuit’s finding of congressional intent).
97. See id. at 1011 (discussing Eighth Circuit’s holding).
98. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
99. See id. at 633 (discussing appellant’s argument).  The Court did agree with
plaintiff that part of the federal statute’s purpose was to encourage use of coal. Id.
100. See id. at 632-34 (noting that federal coal law did not preempt state tax
on coal).
101. See id. at 632-37 (discussing court’s conclusion that statute’s language
and legislative history were absent evidence that suggested state tax would conflict
with federal law).
102. People v. Rinehart, 377 P.3d 818, 820 (Cal. 2016) (outlining court’s
holding).
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to mine immune from the state’s police powers.103  Further, the
court was able to distinguish the current case from cases that Rine-
hart relied heavily on for his defense.104
Judge Kathryn Werdegar of the California Supreme Court be-
gan the court’s inquiry into Rinehart’s case by examining the de-
fendant’s obstacle preemption claim that California state law
impaired “the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.”105  The court explained that there is a
“strong presumption against [obstacle] preemption in areas where
the state has a firmly established regulatory role.”106  In determin-
ing that the state of California had, and still has, a long-standing
interest in protecting the fish and wildlife within the state, the court
recalled English common law that established a sovereign held title
to the waters within its boundaries.107  The court then declined to
address whether the presumption against preemption existed in
this case because “the conclusion [it] would reach with or without
the presumption is unchanged.”108  Finding Rinehart had not met
the burden of establishing that California’s environmental regula-
tions impaired the purposes and objectives of Congress, the obsta-
cle preemption defense did not succeed.109
The court then addressed Rinehart’s principal contention that
the state’s moratorium on suction dredging presented an obstacle
to the Act.110  In doing so, the court conducted a textual analysis of
the Act.111  The court noted that the “Mining Law of 1872 allows
citizens to enter federal land freely and explore for valuable miner-
als.”112  The Act also allows “[l]ocators of valuable minerals [to] ob-
tain a right to possess and develop the area around their claim” and
103. See id. at 825-29 (explaining court’s finding of no general right to mine).
104. Id. at 829-30 (describing court’s distinction between current case and
previous case law).
105. See id. at 822 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))
(describing Rinehart’s reliance on principle of obstacle preemption).
106. Id. at 823 (citing Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc., 361 P.3d 868, 877
(Cal. 2015)) (discussing presumption against obstacle preemption).
107. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 823 (describing long standing public trust doc-
trine that established states had right and power to protect and preserve waterways
within their borders).
108. Id. (noting that presumption against preemption was irrelevant in
analysis).
109. Id. (describing Rinehart’s failure to establish that California’s environ-
mental regulations should be displaced by federal law).
110. Id. (explaining Rinehart’s main defense).
111. Id. at 824 (outlining court’s textual approach to analyzing Mining Law of
1872).
112. Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 824 (describing purpose of Mining Law of 1872).
12
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provides miners the ability to hold formal title to their claim.113
After a textual analysis of the Act, the court determined “the act as a
whole is devoted entirely to the allocation of real property interests
among those who would exploit the mineral wealth of the nation’s
land, not regulation of the process of exploitation – the mining –
itself.”114  The court interpreted that although the Act generally
dealt with mining, the Act focused more on the property interests
available to miners and less on the regulation of mining itself.115
Noting that the Property Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion does not contain a dormant clause, and thus does not prevent
states from exercising their police power, the court examined
whether any language in the Act itself would exclude California
from exercising its police powers on federal land within the state’s
territory.116  Within the Act, miners who claim a right to land are
granted such right “so long as they comply with the laws of the
United States, and with State, territorial, and local regulations.”117
The Act contains one exception, however, which states that “com-
pliance with laws that are ‘in conflict with the laws of the United
States governing [claimants’] possessory title’ is not required.”118
The court emphasized that the sole exception pertained to gov-
erning title, not to the process of mining itself.119  The court wrote
that because the only exception in the Act dealt with property
rights, all other areas could be governed by state and local laws
without conflicting with federal law.120  Furthermore, the court
pointed to a passage of the Act that read “[mineral exploration on
federal land shall occur subject to] ‘the local customs or rules of
miners in the several mining districts, so far as the same are applica-
ble and not inconsistent with the laws of the United States.’”121
The court believed this acknowledgment of state and local law,
along with Congress’ unwillingness to expand exceptions regarding
113. Id. (outlining rights associated with various provisions within Mining Law
of 1872).
114. Id. (explaining court’s conclusion that Act dealt with property interests
for miners as opposed to act of mining).
115. See id. (discussing court’s reading of Act’s text).
116. See id. (considering Property Clause’s implications on state’s powers to
regulate).
117. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 824 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 26) (explaining rights
afforded to miners by Act).
118. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 26) (explaining exception in
Act for noncompliance with state and local laws).
119. See id. (discussing court’s emphasis of exception in Act).
120. Id. (explaining significance of sole exception in Act).
121. Id. (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 22) (explaining Act still requires compliance
with state and local law so long as they are not in conflict with federal law).
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compliance with state and local laws, reflected Congressional intent
to allow state and local laws to govern mining processes.122
The California Supreme Court further supported its conclu-
sion by examining the legislative history surrounding the Mining
Act of 1872.123  The Act originates from the 1866 mining law, which
was a product of then Nevada Senator William Stewart’s proposal to
grant miners a right to attain title to the land they mined for a small
fee.124  Six years later, the legislature passed the Mining Act of 1872
with the declared purpose of “[giving] prospectors tools to secure
their real property interests against federal action.”125  The Act le-
gally authorized local miner rules and allowed state and territorial
legislatures to regulate land sales to miners.126  The court looked to
legislative remarks and determined that the central focus of the Act
was to protect miners against Congress’s power to potentially sell
federal land.127  The court believed the legislative history suggested
the Act was meant to remove “federal obstacles to mining, and spe-
cifically the threat of a property sale, that might deter individual
prospectors and mining concerns from investing effort in mineral
development.”128  The court found that while the Act grants miners
a real federal property interest, that interest, contrary to Rinehart’s
belief, is not immune from the exercise of state police power.129
In addition to examining the legislative history of the Act, the
California Supreme Court looked to historical congressional ac-
tions and determined that Congress has demonstrated a reluctance
to limit state mining regulations and the Mining Law of 1872.130  By
the late nineteenth century, hydraulic mining had become a pre-
122. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 824-25 (summarizing court’s textual analysis of
Act).
123. Id. (considering legislative history in attempt to confirm that no federal
right to mine exists, exempt from state police powers).
124. Id. at 825-26 (explaining origin of Mining Act of 1872).
125. See id. at 826 (noting Mining Act of 1872 was codified after improve-
ments to 1866 mining law).
126. See id. (illustrating how Mining Act of 1872 gave authority to miners in
west).
127. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 826 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1866) (statement of Sen. Stewart)) (describing court’s belief that Mining Act of
1866, whose features were carried into Mining Act of 1872, was meant to protect
miners against Congress’s power to sell federal land).
128. See id. (discussing findings from legislative history).
129. See id. at 826-27 (recognizing extent of property rights limited by state
police powers).
130. See id. (describing congressional acquiescence regarding state mining
regulations).
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ferred method of mining for gold prospectors.131  Although the
process was effective in mining gold, hydraulic mining produced
debris that traveled downstream and led to devastating floods in
lower-lying California farm towns.132  A series of lawsuits filed by
state officials and members of flood impacted communities against
hydraulic mining companies eventually led to widespread injunc-
tions on hydraulic mining throughout California.133  Consequen-
tially, the injunctions essentially halted hydraulic mining in the
state of California.134
Meanwhile, Congress, while endorsing the ban on hydraulic
mining, ordered an investigation into whether “the present conflict
between the mining and farming sections may be adjusted and the
mining industry rehabilitated.”135  Ultimately, hydraulic mining in
California required a permit conditioned on the assurance that
there would be no harm done to rivers and lowland communi-
ties.136  The permit requirement did not revitalize the hydraulic
mining industry, as the process of cleaning debris was deemed eco-
nomically infeasible.137  The hydraulic mining industry never recov-
ered after California state injunctions and Congress’s insistence
that the process not cause environmental damage.138  According to
the Supreme Court of California, this excerpt of mining history
131. See id. (citing Robert L. Kelley, Gold vs. Grain: The Hydraulic Mining Con-
troversy in California’s Sacramento Valley 23-28 (1959) and citing John D. Leshy, The
Mining Law 184 (1987)) (discussing shift in mining methods to more efficient
processes such as hydraulic mining).  Hydraulic mining involves blasting the earth
with “large volumes of high-pressure water” to displace rock and sediment in order
to extract gold. Id.
132. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 827 (outlining hydraulic mining’s environmen-
tal impact).  Waste products such as “gravel, silt, and other earthen debris” were
byproducts of hydraulic mining that would flow downstream and cause flooding.
Id.
133. See id. at 827-28 (citing Woodruff v. N. Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18
F. 753, 806-09 (C.C.D. Cal. 1984)) (discussing series of suits against hydraulic min-
ing companies).  The Woodruff court found the purpose of the mining laws was to
grant land rights to miners, as well as, legalize what was previously considered tres-
pass, but did not find the Mining Law of 1872 should be preempted by state law, as
suggested by the defendants. Id.
134. See id. at 828 (explaining injunctions prevented and “effectively crippled”
hydraulic mining industry in California).
135. See id. (citing Act of October 1, 1888, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., Ch. 1057, 25
STAT. 498 (1888)) (explaining Congress’s allocation of budget for investigation in
response to concerns of damage from mining).
136. See id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 663) (describing permit requirement as result
of congressional investigation into effects of hydraulic mining).
137. See id. (discussing obligation to clean one’s debris in order to receive
mining permit was deemed economically infeasible for hydraulic miners).
138. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 828 (explaining hydraulic mining industry never
recovered after state injunctions and subsequent actions by Congress).
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demonstrated that the Act did not establish a federal right to mine
on federal land without regard of state and environmental inter-
ests.139  The court, once again, reasoned that Congress did not in-
tend for the Act to be immune from the state’s protection of
environmentally damaging methods of mining.140  In fact, Congress
supported the de facto ban on mining and encouraged California
to require permits that essentially impeded the ability of miners to
prospect for gold via hydraulic mining.141
The California Supreme Court’s final step in its analysis was to
examine case law regarding state restrictions on mining.142  The
court quickly rejected a series of cases brought forth in Rinehart’s
defense.143  The court did not find the case law compelling because
all but one case predated Granite Rock, two cases involved statutes
other than the one at issue in this case, and the remaining cases
presented omitted examinations of text, legislative history, and his-
torical context.144
Specifically, the court’s view diverged between the current case
and South Dakota Mining Association Inc. v. Lawrence County.145  The
Eighth Circuit in Lawrence County disallowed an ordinance banning
surface mining in an area that included part of a national park be-
cause it viewed the ordinance as conflicting with the purposes of
the Mining Law of 1872.146  The Supreme Court of California
agreed with the Eight Circuit’s determination that Congress en-
acted the Act to encourage mining.147  The court did not, however,
hold that the state permit regulations in Rinehart conflicted with the
Act.148  Instead, the court held that the permit requirements were
139. See id. (describing court’s view that history suggested there was no fed-
eral right to mine on federal land free from state’s intervention).
140. See id. at 828-29 (explaining court’s finding that Congress did not intend
for the Mining Law of 1872 to stand supreme with regards to state regulations).
141. See id. at 828 (summarizing actions taken by Congress that affirmed
court’s view that Mining Law of 1872 was not immune from state regulation).
142. See id. at 829 (describing court’s analysis of case law).
143. Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 829 (noting court did not find Rinehart’s line of
case law persuasive).
144. See id. at 829-30 (describing court’s reasoning for finding Rinehart’s case
law unpersuasive).
145. 155 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 1998).
146. See id. at 1011 (noting ordinance acted as de facto ban on mining and
was viewed as “clear obstacle” to Congress’s purposes and objectives in Mining Law
of 1872).
147. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 830 (stating court’s belief that Mining Law of
1872 was indeed designed to encourage mining; however, court did not believe
this encouragement was absolute).
148. See id. (distinguishing Supreme Court of California’s holding in Rinehart
and Eighth Circuit’s holding in Lawrence County).
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the result of a compelling state interest in the preservation of its
environment, and such regulations did not substantially frustrate
the purpose of the Act.149  The court wrote that if Congress “viewed
mining as the highest and best use of federal land,” it would have
expressly said so, but instead chose to note that mining should be
done in compliance with state and local laws.150
V. DON’T MINED ME: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF CALIFORNIA’S DECISION
The California Supreme Court’s discussion of Rinehart’s case
relied heavily on legislative history and historical context of mining
regulation.151  The many prongs of the court’s analysis all led to the
conclusion that federal law does not preempt California Fish and
Game Code section 5653, and that the Act did not grant a federal
right to mine, immune from state police powers.152  While the
court’s holding seems correct, its reluctance to truly distinguish its
determination that the congressional intent of the Act was to estab-
lish property rights for miners, from the Eighth Circuit’s finding in
Lawrence County, that the purpose of the Act was to encourage min-
ing of valuable minerals, seems to leave the holding vulnerable to
attack.153  Additionally, the court failed to rely on cases that stand
for the proposition that permit requirements are generally not
viewed as an obstacle to federal environmental regulations.154  Fi-
nally, the court could have considered current procedures for regu-
lating federal lands as a strongly persuasive argument for showing
that there is no federal right to mine.155
The Supreme Court in Granite Rock, the preeminent United
States judicial opinion on the Mining Law of 1872, rejected a facial
149. See id. (explaining court’s belief that state environmental regulations do
not always directly conflict with purpose of Mining Law of 1872).
150. See id. (noting Congress explicitly chose not to write that mining should
surpass all other state interests).
151. For a discussion of the court’s use of legislative history and historical
context to analyze the present case, see supra notes 123-141 and accompanying
text.
152. For a discussion of court’s analysis leading to conclusion that federal law
does not preempt state and that there is no federal right to mine, see supra notes
102-104 and accompanying text.
153. For a discussion of the Supreme Court of California’s opportunity and
reluctance to distinguish Rinehart from Lawrence County, see infra notes 165-177
and accompanying text.
154. For a discussion of precedent, which has held similar local ordinances
are not preempted by federal statues, see infra notes 178-184 and accompanying
text.
155. See infra notes 185-191 and accompanying text (outlining current admin-
istrative agencies regulation of federal land).
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challenge to the California Coastal Commission’s requirement of a
permit before a company could engage in mining.156  Responding
to the appellee’s claim that federal law preempted any state permit
requirement, the Court wrote that in order to avoid preemption,
the appellee needed to show a “possible set of permit conditions
not in conflict with federal law.”157  The Court found that reasona-
ble environmental regulation was sufficient to meet this stan-
dard.158  The Court held that while the Property Clause gives
Congress the plenary power to legislate the use of federal lands, the
clause itself does not conflict with state regulation of federal
lands.159
The standard for preemption set forth in Granite Rock declares
that state environmental regulations must frustrate Congress’s pur-
poses and objectives in order for federal law to preempt state law.160
In Lawrence County, the Eighth Circuit concluded the congressional
intent of the Mining Law of 1872 was “the encouragement of explo-
ration for and mining of valuable minerals located on federal lands
. . . .”161  The court determined the city ordinance, which acted as a
de facto ban on mining, therefore, frustrated Congress’s intended
encouragement of mining on federal land.162  The Supreme Court
of California in Rinehart, on the other hand, concluded that the
purpose of the Mining Law of 1872 was to prevent federal obstacles
to mining and provide property rights for miners.163  The court fur-
ther reasoned that the state regulations should not be preempted
by the Act because the state’s permit requirement and moratorium
156. Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 593 (1987)
(describing court’s rejection of appellee’s facial challenge to state permit
requirement).
157. See id. (outlining test for permit requirement to avoid preemption).
158. See id. at 589 (noting permit requirement permitted if “reasonable state
environmental regulation” is not preempted).
159. See id. at 580-81 (citing Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976))
(explaining Property Clause itself does not automatically conflict with all state reg-
ulation of federal land).
160. Id. at 581 (explaining standard for preemption).  The preemption stan-
dard requires that “state law stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941)).  Preemption will also apply when “it is impossible to comply with both
state and federal law.” Id. (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)).
161. S.D. Mining Ass’n, Inc. v. Lawrence County, 155 F.3d 1005, 1010 (8th
Cir. 1998) (discussing Eighth Circuit’s finding of congressional intent).
162. Id. at 1011 (describing Eighth Circuit’s holding).
163. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 826-27 (discussing court’s finding that Mining
Law of 1872 was enacted to protect against federal interference with property
rights granted by the Act).
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did not, in its view, conflict with the congressional purposes of the
Act.164
Rinehart and Lawrence County are in stark conflict with one an-
other.165  The different findings on congressional intent by the
Eighth Circuit and Supreme Court of California play a pivotal role
in each court’s decision regarding the preemptive reach of the Min-
ing Law of 1872.166  The Rinehart court seemed to acknowledge the
existence of such conflict, writing “[w]here we part company [from
the Lawrence County court] is with the conclusion that such general,
overarching goals would be frustrated by state and local determina-
tions that the use of particular methods, in particular areas of the
country, would disserve other compelling interests.”167 In simply
stating it “part[s] company” with the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme
Court of California failed to take the opportunity to establish that
its finding on the congressional intent of the Act, was the correct
one.168  The court in its opinion provided a thorough and convinc-
ing analysis of the text and legislative history of the Act, yet seem-
ingly abandons its findings by saying it merely “part[s] company”
with the Lawrence County Court, leaving its determination of the
true congressional purpose of the Act vulnerable to attack.169
Another area where the Rinehart court failed to distinguish it-
self from the Lawrence County court deals with Rinehart’s assertion
that the permit moratorium prevented him from using “the only
commercially practicable method of extracting gold from his min-
ing claim.”170  The “commercially practicable” language used by
Rinehart is taken from a hypothetical scenario in Granite Rock,
where the court contemplates “a state environmental regulation so
severe that a particular land use would become commercially im-
164. See id. at 830-31 (finding Mining Law of 1872 requires compliance with
state and local laws and that such laws do not conflict federal law).
165. Id. at 820 (holding California permit requirements for suction dredge
mining are not preempted by Mining Law of 1872). But see Lawrence County, 155
F.3d at 1011 (holding ban on mining in certain areas of national park is pre-
empted by Mining Law of 1872).
166. Id. at 826-27 (finding congressional intent of Mining Law of 1872 was to
protect miner’s property rights from interference by federal government). But see
Lawrence County, 155 F.3d at 1011 (finding congressional intent of Mining Law of
1872 was to encourage mining of valuable mineral deposits located on federal
land).
167. See id. at 830 (noting acknowledgment of conflict with Eighth Circuit).
168. For a further discussion of the court’s approach to finding congressional
intent, see supra notes 105-141 and accompanying text.
169. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 830 (describing conclusion that Congress in-
tended for Mining Law of 1872 to coexist with state and local laws).
170. See id. at 821 (describing Rinehart’s contention that federal law is pre-
emptive because local laws make mining on his claim commercially impracticable).
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practicable.”171  The Court in Granite Rock used this language when
discussing the difficulty in drawing a line between environmental
regulation and land use planning, however, the hypothetical situa-
tion is only mentioned once and serves as dicta in the court’s opin-
ion.172  In Lawrence County, the Eighth Circuit found that because
the de facto ban on surface mineral mining prevented the only
practicable method of mining, it should be preempted by the Min-
ing Law of 1872.173  The Eighth Circuit incorrectly adopted a line
of dicta referring to the distinction between environmental regula-
tion and land use planning as a factor in determining whether the
federal statute should preempt local regulation.174  In Rinehart, the
appellate court explained that the question of whether the permit
moratorium renders mining “commercially impracticable” as an is-
sue of fact and remanded the question to the trial court for further
proceedings.175  Rather than remanding to the trial court, the Su-
preme Court of California should have denounced Rinehart’s de-
fense as the incorrect standard to apply in an analysis of the
preemptive ability of the Mining Law of 1872.176  Not only would
this be consistent with the Supreme Court in Granite Rock, but it
would further distinguish the court’s opinion from the Eighth Cir-
cuit in Lawrence County.177
In addition to failing to distinguish its opinion from Lawrence
County, the California Supreme Court also missed the opportunity
to use a strong line of case law to show that California’s state permit
requirement is not an obstacle to the purpose of the Mining Law of
1872.178  The court takes a compelling view when stating the Act
171. See Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 587 (1987)
(noting example to draw “line between environmental regulation and land use
planning”).
172. See id. (noting that “commercially impracticable” language is only used as
example).
173. See S.D. Mining Ass’n, Inc. v. Lawrence County, 155 F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th
Cir. 1998) (finding that de facto ban on mining on federal lands is clear obstacle
to congressional purpose of Mining Law of 1872).
174. See Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 587 (noting court’s dicta in using “commer-
cially impracticable” language).
175. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 822 (noting court of appeals remanded “com-
mercially impracticable” defense for further proceedings based on factual issues).
176. For a discussion of why commercial practicability of mining is not the
test for preemption, see supra notes 171-175 and accompanying text.
177. See Granite Rock, 480 U.S. 572 (holding permit requirement was not at
conflict with Mining Law of 1872); see also Lawrence County, 155 F.3d 1005 (holding
ban on mining in certain areas of national park was preempted by Mining Law of
1872).
178. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981)
(holding tax on mining was not an obstacle to congressional purpose of federal
coal mining law); see also Woodruff v. N. Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753
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does not allow mining to be pursued at all costs.179  The Supreme
Court, however, has consistently held that even if the Act did have
such a broad purpose, it would be insufficient to preempt all state
regulations dealing with the attainment of such purpose.180  In Com-
monwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, the Supreme Court found that
nothing in the Act’s text or legislative history suggested a tax would
conflict with the purpose of the Act.181  The Court further wrote
that “[preemption] of state law by federal statute or regulation is
not favored ‘in the absence of persuasive reasons—either that the
nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion,
or that Congress has unmistakably so ordained.’”182  The Act con-
tains no statutory purpose other than its general title: “An Act to
promote the Development of the mineral Resources of the United
States.”183  Nothing in the Act’s text or legislative history suggests
persuasive reasons for preemption of state regulations.184
The Court in Granite Rock also cited rules and regulations
promulgated by the Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service
under the Secretary of Agriculture, which is in charge of “regu-
lat[ing] [the] occupancy and use” of national forests.185  Today, the
Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) are the pri-
mary agencies charged with managing the federal lands on which
(C.C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding Mining Law of 1872 did not forbid California from
exercising police power to halt hydraulic mining).
179. For a discussion of the court’s conclusion that the Mining Law of 1872
does not stand for the proposition that mining can be pursued at all costs, see
supra notes 110-141 and accompanying text.
180. See Application of the United States for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief
in Support of Respondent and Proposed Brief of the United States at 13, People v.
Rinehart, 377 P.3d 818 (Cal. 2016) (No. S222620), 2015 WL 51666997 (citing Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Development Comm’n, 461
U.S. 190, 221 (1983)) (noting Supreme Court has routinely rejected argument
that broad statement of purpose for congressional acts should preempt state regu-
lations related to said act).
181. See Commonwealth Edison Co., 453 U.S. at 632 (discussing conclusion that
nothing in statute’s language or legislative history suggested state tax would con-
flict with federal law).
182. Id. at 634 (quoting Chi. & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450
U.S. 311, 317 (1981)) (describing reluctance to apply preemption).
183. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 180, at 15 (noting lack of spe-
cific purpose in Mining Law of 1872).
184. For a discussion of the lack of authority in text or history that suggests
Mining Law of 1872 should preempt state regulations on mining, see supra notes
116-141 and accompanying text.
185. See Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 582 (1987)
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 551) (describing powers vested in Secretary of Agriculture by
Congress).
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mining occurs.186  The Forest Service’s rules expressly require com-
pliance with state air and water quality standards.187  Similarly, the
BLM requires compliance with state environmental laws unless they
directly conflict with federal law.188  The BLM further declares that
if a state regulation is not in conflict with federal law and requires a
higher level of environmental protection, then that regulation
should be followed.189  The Supreme Court in Granite Rock wrote of
such promulgations by agencies, stating that “[i]t is impossible to
divine from these regulations, which expressly contemplate coinci-
dent compliance with state law as well as with federal law, an inten-
tion to pre-empt all state regulation of unpatented mining claims in
national forests.”190  The Supreme Court of California had the op-
portunity to use these current examples of environmental regula-
tions by administrative agencies as further examples proving the
Mining Law of 1872 should not preempt California’s suction dredg-
ing permit requirement and moratorium.191
VI. HAS THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA STRUCK GOLD?
IMPACT OF PEOPLE V. RINEHART
The Mining Law of 1872 is so frequently litigated, it is esti-
mated to have led to the most judicial opinions of any statute.192
The Supreme Court of California’s holding in Rinehart will, there-
fore, likely have some impact on the battle between state regulators
and the mining industry; the question is how broad the scope of the
impact will be.193  At its core, the issues surrounding the Act revolve
186. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 180, at 11 (noting Forest Ser-
vices and BLM primarily manage lands upon which mining occurs under Mining
Law of 1872).
187. See Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 583 (discussing Forest Service’s explicit re-
quirement of compliance with certain state laws).
188. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 180, at 12 (citing 43 C.F.R.
§ 3809.3) (explaining BLM’s requirement of compliance with state environmental
regulations).
189. See id. at 12-13 (discussing BLM’s stance that state regulations that are
not directly in conflict with federal law should be followed, even if such regulation
requires higher level of environmental protection).
190. See Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 584 (asserting Congress had no intention of
preempting all state regulation of unpatented mining claims).
191. For a discussion of environmental regulation by administrative agencies,
see supra notes 185-189 and accompanying text.
192. See Sahand Farahati, Field Report, People v. Rinehart, Conflicting Jurispru-
dence, and Certiorari, COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 5 (Nov. 16, 2016), http://
www.columbiaenvironmentallaw.org/people_v_rinehart/ (citing John D. Leshy,
The Mining Law: A Study in Perpetual Motion 20 (1987)) (discussing prevalence of
Mining Law of 1872 in judicial opinions).
193. See Richard Frank, Look Out Below!, LEGAL PLANET (May 15, 2017), http:/
/legal-planet.org/2017/05/15/look-out-below/ (discussing potential future impli-
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around the principle of federalism and a state’s ability to exercise
its police power in the face of federal legislation.194  Further, a cur-
rent split between the California Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit
leaves much uncertainty on the Act’s preemptive ability.195  The
case may be ripe for consideration by the Supreme Court due to
the constant uncertainty surrounding the statute, along with a cur-
rent split in the courts.196
The Supreme Court of California’s decision in Rinehart is a win
for federalism.197  The court’s holding reassures a state’s police
power to regulate federal land in its territory.198  The decision may
also have persuasive value for many western states whose lands are
predominantly held by the federal government.199  The Rinehart de-
cision sets precedent that environmental regulation of federal lands
within a state can be decided by local governments who share a
closer connection to the local people than the federal
government.200
The Rinehart decision also appears to be a win for environmen-
talists.201  For one, states who are deeply knowledgeable about envi-
ronmental issues impacting their lands now have precedent that
cations of Rinehart decision in light of conflicts between state and federal govern-
ments as well as mining industry).
194. See, e.g., Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 820 (holding state police power is not pre-
empted by Mining Law of 1872).
195. See id. (holding California permit requirements for suction dredge min-
ing are not preempted by Mining Law of 1872). But see S.D. Mining Ass’n, Inc. v.
Lawrence County, 155 F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding ban on mining in
certain areas of national park is preempted by Mining Law of 1872).
196. See Farahati, supra note 192, at 3 (examining likelihood of Supreme
Court granting certiorari in People v. Rinehart).
197. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 820 (giving deference to state police power in
light of potentially conflicting federal statutes).
198. See id. (describing holding that Mining Law of 1872 does not immunize
miners from state’s exercise of police power).
199. See George R. Wentz, Jr., Americans in Western States Are Denied Equal
Rights, NAT’L REVIEW (Aug. 2, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/
article/438586/western-states-federal-lands-conflict-their-sovereignty (discussing
federal statutes governing much of land in twelve western states).  In Utah, for
example, sixty-six percent of the land is federal land regulated by the federal gov-
ernment. Id.
200. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 820 (noting court’s deference to states to exer-
cise police powers on land within their territory).
201. See Farahati, supra note 192 (quoting Alan Septoff, An Unhappy Birthday
for the 1872 Mining Law, EARTH ISLAND J. (May 17, 2016), http://www.earthisland
.org/journal/index.php/elist/eListRead/an_unhappy_birthday_for_the_1872_
mining_law) (describing environmentalist’s sentiments that Mining Law of 1872 is
“a hurtful and embarrassing reminder of the worst of nineteenth-century
thinking”).
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will allow them to govern the lands within their borders.202  Addi-
tionally, the court’s finding that there is no federal right to mine,
gives California, and potentially other states, almost unrestricted
ability to regulate mining under the purview of the state’s police
power.203  Under Rinehart, anything “short of a [complete] ban on
all [types of] mining” seems to be within a state’s power to regulate
their lands.204
The Rinehart ruling is also significant because it conflicts with
the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Lawrence County.205  The split be-
tween California’s highest state court and the federal Eighth Circuit
may ultimately be decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States.206  In Lawrence County, the Eighth Circuit found the Mining
Law of 1872 preempted a city ordinance that acted as a de facto ban
on mining because it frustrated the congressional intent of the Act,
which was to encourage mining on federal lands.207  By contrast,
the Supreme Court of California concluded in Rinehart that the
Act’s purpose was to prevent federal obstacles to mining and pro-
vide property rights for miners and, therefore, permit requirements
were not preempted by the Mining Law of 1872.208  This distinction
in regard to the Act’s congressional intent is key to determining
whether or not the Act should preempt state and local regulations
that impose environmental restrictions on mining.209  Whereas
adopting the Eighth Circuit’s decision would reinforce the Act and
potentially free miners from environmental restrictions that burden
202. See Wentz, supra note 199 (pointing out that land in many western states
is predominately governed by arbitrary powers of federal government).
203. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 825 (noting court’s rejection of argument that
Mining Law of 1872 provides miners with federal right to mine, immune from state
police powers).
204. See Farahati, supra note 192 (noting Rinehart decision would give extreme
deference to states to regulate their lands).
205. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 820 (holding California permit requirements for
suction dredge mining are not preempted by Mining Law of 1872). But see S.D.
Mining Ass’n, Inc. v. Lawrence County, 155 F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing ban on mining in certain areas of national park is preempted by Mining Law of
1872).
206. See Farahati, supra note 192, at 3 (explaining that split in courts increases
chance Supreme Court will grant certiorari).
207. See Lawrence County, 155 F.3d at 1011 (explaining court’s finding that de
facto ban on mining on federal lands is clear obstacle to congressional purpose of
Mining Law of 1872).
208. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 826-27 (describing court’s finding regarding
congressional intent of Mining Law of 1872).
209. Id. (finding congressional intent of Mining Law of 1872 was to protect
miner’s property rights from interference by federal government). But see Lawrence
County, 155 F.3d at 1011 (finding Congress intended to promote mining on federal
lands through enactment of Mining Law of 1872).
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their mining activities, siding with the Supreme Court of California
would be a victory for both federalism and environmentalism.210
After the California Supreme Court’s decision was handed
down, Brandon Rinehart petitioned the United States Supreme
Court to review the case.211  In January 2018, the United States Su-
preme Court rejected Rinehart’s petition to grant certiorari.212
Thus, not only will Brandon Rinehart have to deal with the conse-
quences of his conviction, the California moratorium on suction
dredging will continue for the foreseeable future, and the split in
the courts regarding preemption by the Mining Law of 1872 will
persist until the Supreme Court decides to provide further
clarification.213
Rohan Mohanty*
210. For a further discussion of the environmental impacts of the Rinehart
decision, see supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion of
the federalism impacts of the Rinehart decision, see supra notes 197-200 and accom-
panying text.
211. See Frank, supra note 193 (stating Rinehart and his counsel have peti-
tioned United States Supreme Court to review his case).
212. David Ettinger, SCOTUS Denies Cert in Supreme Court Mining Case, HORVITZ
& LEVY LLP: AT THE LECTERN (Jan. 8, 2018, 8:55 AM), http://www.atthelectern.
com/scotus-denies-cert-in-supreme-court-mining-case/ (explaining Supreme
Court rejected petition for certiorari of People v. Rinehart after U.S. Solicitor Gen-
eral recommended against review).
213. See Rinehart, 377 P.3d at 821-22 (describing penalties for Rinehart’s viola-
tion); see id. at 821 (explaining current status of California suction dredging mora-
torium).  For a discussion of the split in the courts, see supra notes 165-169 and
accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.S., 2014, University of Delaware.
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